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ROLLUPS OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS:
QUESTIONS OF REGULATION AND
FAIRNESS
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
I. THE ROLLUP PHENOMENON
Frequently, despite differences in the formal nature of the events and
transactions under scrutiny, the same basic legal issues recur. Whether a
particular type of conflict of interest is troublesome is an example of such
a recurrent legal question. Rollups of limited partnerships, recently the
object of attention from Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), and the investing public, raise many conflict-of-interest ques-
tions similar to those leveraged buyouts (LBOs) present. To be sure,
LBOs and rollups differ in many ways; they tend, nonetheless, to share
features that induce squeamishness in many observers.
In a rollup transaction, limited partnerships are combined or reorga-
nized, and new securities are issued to the partners. The typical rollup
involves finite-life limited partnerships, which are merged or reorganized
into a new partnership, corporation, or real estate investment trust. The
successor entity whose securities the limited partners received has differ-
ent compensation arrangements with the general partner and different
policies for reinvestment and distribution of earnings and proceeds from
asset sales than did the original limited partnership entities. Often the
new entity's securities are listed for trading on a stock exchange or
through NASDAQ. Although the proponent of a rollup might be a third
party, many rollup proponents have been the limited partnership's gen-
eral partner or a person or entity affiliated with the general partner.
Like an LBO, a rollup substitutes, for the equity interests public inves-
tors initially held in securities, something quite different. Like an LBO, a
rollup--especially if it includes multiple limited partnerships-raises nu-
merous complex questions about valuation of the assets and entities in-
volved. Finally, like a management-endorsed LBO, a rollup proposed by
an incumbent general partner or its affiliate may confer substantial
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I recall with fondness F. Hodge O'Neal,
whom we honor at this conference. He was my colleague during my first year at Duke and, then and
thereafter, a genial source of encouragement and wise counsel.
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benefits on persons occupying fiduciary positions, benefits created by the
use of the entity's own assets.1 Indeed, the structure of many rollups
furthers the general partner's interests, both visibly and aggressively.
Surveying the last decade's control transactions in aggregate, one
might view rollups as an intriguing but relatively minor phenomenon, as
a brightly colored small fry in an ocean of much larger fish. Between
January 1, 1985 and February 22, 1991, registration statements for sixty-
five rollups became effective, involving 1,197 entities, about 1.2 million
investors and a reported exchange value2 of approximately $6.9 billion.
Eighty-three percent of these rollups involved either real estate or oil and
gas partnerships.' The aggregate amount involved in rollup transactions
represents about two percent of the aggregate value of investments sub-
ject since 1985 to transactions involving a change of control.4 From this
aggregate perspective, it may seem surprising that the small fry spawned
the extensive legislative and regulatory activity described below. In
many respects, however, both rollups and investors in limited partner-
ships involved in rollups have characteristics that make legal intervention
easy to explain.
Consider first the demographics of ownership. Large numbers of lim-
ited partnerships offered investment interests to the public in the 1980s.1
Limited partnership interests sold by broker-dealers are overwhelmingly
1. See generally A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private" Halfa Generation Later, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 571 (1992) (detailing recurring normative questions raised by LBOs and other variants on
going-private transactions).
2. Exchange value is based on the appraised value of the limited partnership's assets. The
purpose of calculating an exchange value is to set a conversion ratio between limited partners' equity
interests and equity interests (shares or limited partnership units) in the successor entity. Exchange
value is computed on the assumption that the partnership's property will be sold by a willing seller to
a willing buyer over a reasonable period of time. Thus, exchange value is not the same as, and
indeed would be greater than, liquidation value, which assumes a prompt sale of the partnership's
assets and its subsequent dissolution. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Follow-up Report of
SEC Staff on "Roll-Ups" of Limited Partnership Interests, April 16, 1991 [hereinafter SEC Follow-
up Report], in Limited Partnerships: Hearings on H.R. 1885 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 419, 423
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings].
3. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on "Roll-ups" of Limited Partnership In-
terests [hereinafter SEC Rollup Report], in Hearings, supra note 2, at 102, 105-06.
4. Hearings, supra note 2, at 216 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
5. Between January 1, 1985 and February 22, 1991, about 1,700 limited partnerships regis-
tered approximately $104 billion in limited-partnership interests with the SEC for sale to the public.
Roughly 13,800 limited partnerships filed a Form D for offerings of $87 billion, for Regulation D
and other offerings exempt from registration under § 4 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)
(1988). See SEC Rollup Report, supra note 3, at 106.
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a "retail" product, promoted and sold to individual investors (sold suc-
cessfully to eight million individual investors, by one estimate).6 Few
institutions invest in or follow the fate of these securities. Second, the
typical limited partnership subsequently involved in a rollup initially will
have sold finite-life interests to its investors.7 Investors in these limited
partnerships were perhaps aware of the cyclical nature of the industries
involved (most often real estate and oil and gas). Indeed, investors also
may have realized that a fickle Congress might jeopardize or eliminate
the tax-favored status their investments enjoy. But the risks the limited
partners assumed and the miseries they suffered were focused initially on
specific assets and projects for a finite duration. The rollup substituted
an infinite-life security with a different configuration of risk and return
characteristics. Third, unlike shareholders in corporations, under state
law limited partners generally have no right to dissent from merger or
reorganization transactions and receive the fair value of their investment
interests in cash. By latest count, three states and the District of Colum-
bia now mandate dissenters' rights8 under some circumstances,9 in
merger or other reorganization transactions involving limited partner-
ships.10 These amendments to states' limited-partnership statutes,
6. Hearings, supra note 2, at 33 (testimony of John F. Blake, Chairman, American Associa-
tion of Limited Partners). Another estimate is that 10 million individuals bought into limited part-
nerships in the 1970s and 1980s, investing about $90 billion in publicly traded units in a diverse
range of businesses, including real estate, oil and gas ventures, equipment leasing, and cable televi-
sion. William Power, Market for Limited Partnership is Rife with "Predatory Pricing," NASD Finds,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1991, at Cl.
7. Limited Partner Roll-up Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 29,313, [Current] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,810, at 81,819 (June 17, 1991) [hereinafter SEC Rollup Rule Proposal].
8. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15679.1 to 15679.14 (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-428(h)
(1990); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-208(0 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW
§§ 121-1105 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
9. Under the California statute, appraisal rights are unavailable if the security to be exchanged
is publicly traded. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15679.2(b)(1)(A) (West 1991). If, however, five percent or
more of any class of interests demand that their interests be purchased for cash, appraisal rights are
available even for publicly traded securities. The limits on appraisal rights for shareholders in corpo-
rations are comparable. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(b)(l) (West 1991).
10. Many rollup transactions lead to a surviving entity that is a corporation. Achieving this
result may dictate how the transaction is structured, depending on the applicable state's law. Dela-
ware permits the direct merger or consolidation of limited partnerships formed under Delaware law
with corporations, whether foreign or domestic. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211 (Supp. 1990).
Delaware's limited partnership statute does not compel the provision of dissenters' rights to limited
partners in any merger or consolidation transaction. See id. The Delaware corporation statute per-
mits the direct merger or consolidation, with a Delaware corporation, of domestic and foreign lim-
ited partnerships. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 263 (Supp. 1990). Under this statute, dissenters'
appraisal rights are limited to stockholders. See id. § 262(a). Other states require a more indirect
Washington University Open Scholarship
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however, followed a spurt of rollup activity. At the time, a rollup re-
quired simply the approval of the proportion of limited partners specified
in the limited partnership agreement or statute-typically a simple ma-
jority-to bind all limited partners to the rollup's terms. As a result,
from the standpoint of nonassenting limited partners, the transaction re-
sembled a "cramdown" in a bankruptcy reorganization rather than a
buyout."1 The public image of rollups was not enhanced by the wide-
spread practice of paying, out of the limited partnership's assets, fees to
broker-dealers and proxy soliciting firms on an outcome-contingent ba-
sis. 2 "Yes" votes earned a fee while "no" votes did not, and the entire
amount of compensation paid depended on whether the rollup was
approved. 13
Finally, while the securities issued in rollup transactions have not
fared well as a group in secondary trading, the typical rollup proposed by
a general partner confers benefits on the general partner or its affiliate.
Rollup sponsors have argued that the transactions benefitted limited
partners by replacing an illiquid, infrequently traded security with a liq-
uid, listed, and tradeable security. Liquidity appears, however, to have
been achieved at a cost. The SEC examined trading-price data for
ninety-two partnerships involved in fourteen rollup transactions, partner-
route, involving more discrete transactions, to achieve the same end. One such plan would involve
an exchange offer, made by the rolup-surviving corporation to the limited partners, offering shares
of stock in the corporation in exchange for the limited partnership's assets. The rollup's proponents
would also solicit the consent of a majority of the limited partners to the dissolution of the limited
partnership and distribution of the stock, on terms set forth in the consent. See CAL. CoRP. CODE
§ 15681(b) (West 1991) (except as otherwise provided in partnership agreement, nonjudicial dissolu-
tion shall occur upon the consent of the general partner and a majority in interest of the limited
partners). The dissenters' rights provision in the California statute applies to "reorganization" trans-
actions in which one limited partnership exchanges interests in itself for partnership interests that it
acquires in another limited partnership, if immediately after the acquisition it is in control of the
other limited partnership. See id. § 15679.1(a)(3). Of course, the provision also applies to mergers
among two or more limited partnerships into one of them. See id. § 15678.1. The dissenters' rights
provision does not seem to specify its applicability when the merger or reorganization involves a
corporation, as could occur under § 263 of the Delaware Corporation Code.
11. A "cramdown" imposes a reorganization plan on a dissenting class of creditors. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). It requires the court's approval. See infra notes 78-79.
12. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Corporation in Con-
nection with the Solicitation of Roll-ups of Direct Participation Programs, Exchange Act Release
No. 29,582, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,095 (Aug. 19, 1991) (approving new rule of National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) barring members from receiving differential compensation for soliciting
votes to approve rollups; compensation limited to two percent of exchange value of newly issued
securities in rollups).
13. See id. The NASD's rule prohibits its members from soliciting unless the general partner
or rollup sponsor agrees to pay all expenses if the limited partners do not approve the rollup.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/19
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ships for which prior trading data, albeit sporadic, existed. Excluding
one rollup that distributed substantial cash to limited partners, trading
prices of the surviving entities on the first trading day after the rollup
were twenty-three percent below prices prior to the rollup.14 More gen-
erally, the same study found post-rollup trading prices to be 16.5% be-
low exchange values.15 Interestingly, shares in real estate investment
trusts (REITs)-as subject to the slump in real estate prices as real estate
rollups-grew in value during the 1980s at an annual rate of 8.25%.16
At the same time, the typical rollup achieved advantages for its spon-
soring general partner. First, the constitutional documents for the sur-
viving entity typically make it difficult for equity holders to remove the
entity's management.' 7 Many rollups shift the basis of the general part-
ner's compensation from management fees determined as a percentage of
distributions paid to limited partners to fees determined by the amount of
assets under management.'" In depressed markets affecting the real es-
tate and oil and gas industries, a shift away from compensation contin-
14. See SEC Follow-up Report, supra note 2, at 429-30.
15. Id. at 430-31.
16. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of John F. Blake). One reason for this differ-
ence might be that federal tax law compels a REIT to distribute as taxable dividends at least 95% of
its "real estate investment trust taxable income," rather than retaining the earnings. See I.R.C.
§ 857(aX1) (1988).
17. A consolidated master limited partnership emerging from a rollup might, for example, re-
quire a two-thirds vote of limited partners to remove the general partner. If the surviving entity is a
corporation, an option under the Delaware corporation statute would be a certificate provision stag-
gering the terms of the corporation's directors, with directors being removeable only for cause (un-
less the certificate provides otherwise). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 141(k)(1) (1991). Another
certificate provision might require a supermajority shareholder vote to remove directors for cause.
See id. § 102(b)(4). Although no Delaware case addresses the permissibility of such a supermajority
provision directly, at least one case notes such a provision without questioning it. See Stroud v.
Milliken Enters., Inc., 585 A.2d 1306, 1329 (Del. Ch. 1988) (corporation's certificate authorized
removal for cause only upon affirmative vote of 75% of shareholders). Compare REV. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 7.27 & 8.08 (1983) (articles may provide directors removeable only for cause; articles
may set greater voting requirements for shareholder action than those specified in statute) with CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 204(2)(5), 301.5 & 303 (West 1991) (articles may not increase vote required to
remove directors; any or all directors are removeable without cause if removal approved by out-
standing shares; if a listed corporation has articles providing for a classified board, director is not
removeable if votes cast against removal would suffice to elect the director if voted cumulatively in
election of directors).
18. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 259, 264 (statement of Frank J. Wilson, Executive Vice
President and General Counsel, NASD). Post-rollup, the operating costs of the surviving entity may
be substantially greater than those of the constituent limited partnerships. See, eg., MILESTONE
PROPERTIES, INC., PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUs 27 (Oct. 12, 1990) (initial operating expenses
of corporation resulting from rollup to be approximately $768,666 higher than combined operating
expenses of partnerships, approximately $372,334 in 1990; cost increase reflects shift from passive
Washington University Open Scholarship
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gent on cash flow would be advantageous to the general partner. Rollups
also change the general partner's original subordinated interest in pro-
ceeds generated by asset sales to an interest on a par with the limited
partners' residual interest.19 The typical rollup, moreover, loosens or
eliminates initial restrictions on borrowing and on a rich array of trans-
actions between and among affiliated entities (including loans and asset
transfers).20 Finally, by combining limited partnerships with variable
track records, the general partner reduces its potential liability for
nonperforming properties by enlarging and diversifying the entity's
assets.21
This narrative raises two questions, one immediate and one more sub-
tle. First, why did limited partners often (but not always) vote to ap-
prove these transactions? Second, did reputational effects play any role?
Specifically, were any securities-industry participants prompted by a con-
cern for their own reputations to constrain the opportunistic behavior
that seems to typify rollup proposals?22 The first question has a large
number of possible answers. Publicly offered limited partnerships were
purchased by a highly diffuse base of retail investors, each of whom
property management to an active operating company and includes salaries of corporation's
management).
19. If the rollup allocates stock in a successor corporation to a general partner, its original
subordinated interest has been elevated to the residual interest of limited partners who also receive
stock. Rollup prospectuses have been known to acknowledge that the basis for allocating a particu-
lar equity stake to the general partner may approach the ineffable. See MILESTONE PROPERTiES,
INC., supra note 18, at 41 (investment banker's valuation of components necessary to reaching opin-
ion as to fairness of equity allocation was "necessarily subjective"). The allocation of equity to the
general partner in this particular rollup had an interesting history, fully chronicled in the Proxy
Statement/Prospectus (PS/P). The initial terms of the proposed merger, described in a preliminary
PS/P, met with dissatisfaction from a former officer of the general partner who, along with his
family and IRA trust, owned 87 limited partnership units. The initial terms allocated 15% of the
rollup corporation's equity to the general partner. Negotiations among the general partner and the
objecting limited partner and his lawyer led to a reduction to 9% in the equity to be allocated to the
general partner. Id. at 45. The negotiations also led to the cash payment of $30,000 to the limited
partner "to compensate him for the time spent in opposing the original transaction and negotiating
the terms of the Merger," an additional payment of $5,000 to review the PS/P, and the payment of
his reasonable attorney's fees (estimated at $60,000). The PS/P described all three payments as
"part of the costs of the proposed merger...." Id. The corporation and the partnership also agreed
to indemnify the limited partner "in connection with any liability arising out of the proposed merger
or his involvement with the related documents." Id.
20. See SEC Rollup Report, supra note 3, at 110.
21. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 264 (statement of Frank Wilson).
22. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary
Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992) (discussing concern for one's reputa-
tion as a possible deterrent to opportunistic behavior).
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invested only ten thousand dollars on average.23 Thus, most investors
did not have large individual stakes in their limited partnerships and, but
for their association as fellow limited partners, were not associates. The
SEC's rules on proxy solicitation complicated any effort to organize pre-
viously unassociated limited partners to oppose a rollup proposal. In
particular, SEC Rule 14a-2(b)(1) defines as a "solicitation," to which the
rules apply, any solicitation of ten or more persons; 24 under SEC Rule
14a-6, proxy soliciting material must be filed in preliminary form with
the SEC at least ten days prior to its distribution to security holders.25
These rules reportedly surprised limited partners attempting to organize
opposition among fellow investors.26 Moreover, many roliups were ag-
gressively promoted by broker-dealers and proxy soliciting firms, an un-
surprising fact given the common practice of making their compensation
outcome contingent.27 Unsophisticated investors, suggests one source,
may be loath to do things that will incur the ire of the general partner,
recognizing that after the rollup the persons in control of the general
partner will continue to be significant actors.28
Limited partners might also vote to approve a rollup because other
options are limited and unattractive. As noted above, limited partners
did not have the statutory right to exit from the partnerships and the
transaction through the exercise of appraisal rights. The secondary
market in limited-partnership units is informal and thin-one study
23. Hearings, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of John F. Blake) (average limited partnership
investment was $10,000).
24. SEC Rule 14a-2(bXl), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1991). See also SEC Rule 14a-l(l), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) (1991) (defining "solicitation" to include the furnishing of a form of proxy or
other communication under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, with-
holding, or revocation of a proxy).
25. SEC Rule 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1991).
26. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 15-17 (statement of Anne Petrocci) (limited partner who
distributed one-page statement of opposition to rollups at meeting of limited partners received phone
calls seven days later from SEC official who informed her that she might have violated the securities
laws; limited partner was "pretty intimidated" because "[it is like getting a call from the IRS. I
don't know anything about the SEC").
27. Repeated telephone contacts between soliciting agents and limited partners were common.
See id. at 254 (statement of Michael Joseph Connolly, Massachusetts Secretary of State). One wit-
ness opined that solicitors' tactics "closely resemble[d] the activities of 'boilerroom' operators we see
peddling phony investments to the public." Id. at 304-05 (statement of Dee Harris on behalf of
NASAA).
28. See Kenneth R. Hillier, Note, Rolling Down the Curtain on "Roll-Ups'" The Case for Fed-
eral Legislation to Protect Limited Partners, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 155, 160 (1991). Hillier specifically
discusses litigation as an action that limited partners fear the general partner will take badly; other
acts, including voting, also seem vulnerable to a fear of retaliation.
1992]
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estimates that only $250 million to $300 million in such units are sold
annually.29 Additionally, the National Association of Securities Dealer
(NASD) has publicly asserted that this market is afflicted by widespread
objectionable practices, including excessive markups. 30 Prices in the sec-
ondary market for limited-partnership units also reflect the unkind treat-
ment Congress gave to many limited partnerships and their partners in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Similarly, some limited partners may vote to
approve an otherwise problematic rollup transaction because the rollup is
generally not a taxable event, and the limited partner values her retention
of a continuing ability to time the recognition of income. If instead the
limited partnership liquidates its assets or enters bankruptcy proceedings,
limited partners experience taxable events that often lead to the recapture
of prior tax benefits.31
Rollup proponents seemed remarkably free of concern that their repu-
tations would be damaged due to their association with a problematic
transaction. In one notable exception, some broker-dealers, having ini-
tially sold the limited partnership to their retail customers, refused to
promote the rollup and, in some instances, actively pressed the rollup
sponsors to design a better deal. Krupp Corp. of Boston twice amended
one 1990 real estate rollup in response to criticism from brokers and in-
vestors, reducing fees paid to the soliciting dealer and shifting a portion
of the solicitation costs onto Krupp itself.32 The general effect of broker-
dealers' concern for reputational effects was likely limited by the reported
practices of other rollup sponsors, which included threats to sue broker-
dealers who recommended "no" votes against the transactions, accompa-
nied by threats to pass on client lists to other broker-dealers who then
could earn the commission payable for a "yes" vote.33
29. Power, supra note 6, at Cl (reporting results of NASD study).
30. See id.
31. Under present law, if the entity surviving the rollup is a partnership, no gain or loss is
recognized to the partnership or the contributing partners if the rollup is an exchange of partnership
assets for an interest in the surviving partnership. See I.R.C. § 721(a) (1986). If the surviving entity
is a corporation, no gain or loss is recognized if property is transferred to a corporation solely in
exchange for stock in the corporation, and if immediately after the exchange such person or persons
are in control of the corporation. See id. § 351(a). "Control" for this purpose means ownership of
stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
32. See Thomas Watterson, Some Troubled Partnerships Turn To 'Rollups', BoSTON GLOBEI,
Dec. 13, 1990, at 109 (City ed.).
33. See Joyce Terhaar, Centennial Suffers New Cash Crisis, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 1989,
at D1 (reporting threats by Centennial Group, Inc. in connection with rollup of real estate limited
partnerships).
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II. REACTIONS TO THE PHENOMENON
As it happens, the pace of rollup proposals flagged noticeably in late
1990 after a House subcommittee began to hold oversight hearings on
rollups.34 Although many factors could explain this drop, including
prior completion of rollups for most partnerships in which the transac-
tion would benefit all concerned, a reported explanation is the sensitivity
of rollup sponsors to close scrutiny of any pending transaction by the
SEC and the House subcommittee. On the congressional front, con-
cern with rollups led to proposed legislation, described below. Among
other provisions, the proposals mandate dissenters' rights. The SEC
adopted a new rule to enhance the quality of disclosure rollup sponsors
make to limited partners, along with a statement of interpretive guidance
on complying with its earlier disclosure requirements. NASD adopted a
rule prohibiting its members from accepting differential compensation to
solicit votes approving rollups. And, as noted above, a few states
amended their limited-partnership statutes to mandate dissenters' rights
for limited partners.
An initial matter, however, is the general justification for any legisla-
tive or administrative response. Investors in publicly offered limited
partnerships were characterized in congressional hearings as, by and
large, individuals well above the poverty line who invested a fraction of
their investment portfolios in vehicles that often afforded tax benefits to
the investors.36 To be sure, investing a major proportion of one's wealth
in an illiquid interest in assets managed entirely by others would recom-
mend itself to few investors. Additionally, limited partners bought secur-
ities in an entity defined by its limited-partnership agreement and by the
relevant state's limited-partnership statute, even when the agreement did
not foreclose the rollup scenario and state law permitted rollups but did
not mandate dissenters' rights. Should the risk of being rolled up thus be
34. Hearings, supra note 2, at 212 (statement of Subcommittee Chairman Edward J. Markey).
35. See id. (Chairman Markey predicts that "the next rolup which is offered is going to afford
the general partners an incredible front row experience as to how Congress works [as] we dissect the
operation of that rollup."). See also id. at 215 (SEC Chairman Breeden predicts that "those spon-
sors would also have a chance to see the hailed abilities of the SEC to review documents very, very
carefully.").
36. Or in the more colorful language of one witness before the House subcommittee, "Itihis so-
called [limited partnership] industry came about by selling tax abuses to tax dodgers." Limited
Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energyand Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony
of Scott G. Miller, President, Miller Reports).
1992]
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characterized as simply another investment risk, comparable to the im-
pact of macroeconomic trends on the partnership's business? Should
mitigating the consequence of a rollup simply be left to provisions in
partnership agreements?
Justifications that support the provision of mandatory dissenters'
rights to corporate shareholders seem just as applicable in the limited-
partnership setting. In both settings, a merger transaction binds all eq-
uity holders to a forced exchange of their original investment securities
for securities (or other consideration) that may be dramatically different.
Indeed, in the typical rollup, limited partners initially held finite-life se-
curities representing residual and income interests in specific properties
and projects. The rollup mandates the exchange of these securities for
infinite-life securities with differently defined claims on income and asset-
sale proceeds, over a more diversified pool of assets. The resulting meta-
morphosis in investment security seems more profound than that pro-
duced by many corporate mergers. Moreover, the publicly offered
limited-partnership interest is an investment product, defined by terms
that do not reflect individually negotiated deals with investors who be-
come partners.
It is also difficult to argue that most limited partners, especially those
who invested before the rollup transaction became common, knew when
they invested of the future risk of being rolled up. Although the SEC
requires that the offering document summarize the provisions of the part-
nership agreement, including its voting requirements, it has not required
"a specific line item disclosure.., about the possibility of a future rollup
transaction." 7 Indeed, one might instead argue that the apparently
comprehensive quality of disclosure the SEC mandates makes this omis-
sion significant in itself, as it arguably leads investors to believe that all
major risk factors have been affirmatively disclosed. Moreover, rollup
proposals confront limited partners with a yes-no, take-it-or-leave-it, up-
down vote on one proposed transaction. Limited partners who might
prefer continuation of the partnership under its original terms, or liqui-
dation of its assets, to the rollup have no explicit opportunity to rank
those preferences along with the rollup proposal.
Finally, the internal governance structure of a limited partnership dif-
fers significantly from that of a publicly traded corporation. Limited
partnerships lack independent directors-that is, persons not affiliated
37. Hearings, supra note 2, at 248 (t6stimony of Richard Breeden).
[Vol. 70:617
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with the entity's operating management who are capable of acting on
behalf of the interests of public equity holders. Even observers who are
skeptical about the role of independent directors in responding to LBO
proposals concede the existence of "counter-examples in which a com-
mittee of structurally independent directors has appeared to function
quite adversarily" to management's interests.38
The legislative proposals that emerged from the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce and the Senate Banking Committee include two
different components: they mandate specified dissenters' rights in lim-
ited-partnership rollups and attempt to reform proxy solicitations con-
ducted in connection with rollups. The dissenters' rights provisions
amount to a limited preemption of state law. They would amend sec-
tions 6(b) and 15A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 39 to require that
stock exchanges and registered securities associations deny listing to rol-
lup-generated securities and prohibit association members' participation
in a rollup subject to the statute,' unless the rollup transaction includes
specified dissenters' rights for limited partners. These rights consist of
the right to an appraisal and compensation or to retain a security under
the same terms and conditions as the original security, unless the associa-
38. William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?,
45 Bus. LAW 2055, 2059 (1990) (observation of Delaware's Chancellor).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3 (1988).
40. The legislation defines "partnership rolup transaction" as "a transaction involving the
combination or reorganization of one or more partnerships, either directly or indirectly, whereby
investors in the original partnership or partnerships receive new securities or securities of another
entity in exchange for their partnership interests." H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § (b)(4)(A)
(1991). The definition is subject to exclusions, including transactions involving only issuers (both
pre and post-rollup) that are not required to register or report under § 12 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 781 (1988); transactions involving only the reorganization or restructuring of a single part-
nership resulting in "no significant adverse change in any of... voting rights, the term of existence
of the entity, management compensation or investment objectives. . ."; and transactions involving
the reorganization of a single partnership to corporate, trust, or association form "if each investor is
provided an option to retain a security under substantially the same terms and conditions of the
original issue.... ." H.R. 1885, §§ 2(a)(4)(AXii)-(iv). Thus, whether a conversion of a single limited
partnership into a corporation would be defined as a "rollup" depends on the transaction's treatment
of limited partners, its impact on the duration and objectives of the entity itself, and its impact on
management compensation. See also S. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). For a description of a
proposed conversion, see Karen Blumenthal, Mesa's Pickens, Reversing His Stance, Wants to Change
Firm to a Corporation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1991, at C15 (describing proposed exchange offer to be
followed by l-for-5 reverse stock swap; transaction would enable limited partnership to eliminate at
deep discount $164 million in accrued distributions owed to preferred unit holders). See also In re
Mesa Ltd. Partnership Preferred Unitholders Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 96,454
(Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1991) (court declines to enjoin conversion of single limited partnership into
corporation).
Washington University Open Scholarship
628 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tion or exchange determines that granting those rights would be
infeasible or not in the financial interest of dissenting limited partners. In
that event, limited partners are entitled to "other comparable rights,"
which could include the use of an independent committee, unaffiliated
with the general partner or sponsor, with the authority to protect limited
partners' interests by hiring independent advisors, negotiating on the lim-
ited partners' behalf, and making recommendations to limited partners
concerning the proposed rollup. "Comparable rights" also include lim-
ited partners' rights not to have their voting power unfairly reduced or
abridged, the right not to bear an unfair portion of the costs of a rejected
rollup transaction, and "restrictions on the conversion of management
profit-sharing interests and incentive fees into asset-based management
fees."41
The proxy reform proposals in some respects seem to reiterate, clarify,
or modestly expand certain aspects of present proxy regulation, such as
the issuer's obligation to provide a list of security holders to a holder,42
which some rollup sponsors reportedly had refused to do.43 Addition-
ally, no solicitation or offering period may be briefer than the greater of
sixty days or a period set by the SEC. More substantively, the proposals
require a rollup proponent to include in its soliciting materials "an opin-
ion on the fairness of the proposed transaction to holders of each secur-
ity," which includes "such information, representations, and
undertakings with respect to the analysis of the transaction, scope of re-
view, preparation of the opinion, and basis for and methods of arriving at
conclusions" as the SEC may require by rule. The preparer of the fair-
ness opinion must meet criteria set by the SEC for independence and may
not receive compensation contingent on the transaction's approval or
41. H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2)(12)(E) (1991).
42. At present, under SEC rule 14a-7(c), a security holder has no absolute right to obtain a list
of fellow holders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c) (1991). The SEC has proposed a revision of its proxy
rules-presently on hold-to amend Rule 14a-7 so that the security holder requesting a list, rather
than the issuer, would have an election whether to obtain the list (at his or her own expense) or have
the soliciting materials mailed by the issuer. See Regulation of Shareholder Communications, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,811, at 81,859-60 (June 17, 1991). State law defines
limited partners' rights to obtain such lists. See REV. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACr
§§ 105(a)(1) & (b) (1985) (limited partnership to maintain at its office in state a current list of part-
ners' full names and last known addresses; records available to inspection and copying at the reason-
able request and at the expense of any partner).
43. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 447 (statement of Massachusetts Securities Division) (report-
ing claim of general partner sponsoring rollup that it has discretion to "exercise business judgment"
whether to release list to investors opposing rollup).
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completion. The preparer must be given access to the issuer's premises,
personnel, and relevant books and records. Finally, the preparer must be
represented "to have undertaken an independent analysis of the fairness
of the proposed rollup transaction to holders based upon the information
obtained through such access and upon other independently obtained
information...."I
The proposals thus go further than the SEC's going-private rule, Rule
13e-3, which does not require the issuer to obtain an independent fairness
opinion. Under SEC Rule 13e-3, if the issuer receives "any report, opin-
ion (other than an opinion of counsel) or appraisal from an outside party
which is materially related to the Rule 13e-3 transaction," the issuer
must disclose to shareholders its findings and recommendations, any lim-
itations imposed by the issuer or affiliate, the procedures followed by the
preparer, the preparer's compensation, and any "material relationship"
between the preparer and the issuer or its affiliates occurring in the past
two years or mutually contemplated for the future.45 Likewise, Rule 13e-
3 directly regulates neither the independence of parties who render fair-
ness opinions nor the structure of their compensation.
In June 1991, to enhance disclosure in connection with rollups, the
SEC proposed rules which it adopted in late October. In retrospect, the
SEC's overall response to the rollup phenomenon seems less than ideal.
Rollups require the solicitation of limited partners' consents and thus are
subject to the SEC's proxy solicitation rules if the issuer is registered
under the Securities Exchange Act. If the rollup transaction entails an
exchange of securities, the registration and prospectus requirements in
the Securities Act may apply. Finally, many rollup transactions fit
within the scope of SEC Rule 13e-3 because the transaction entails the
purchase of equity securities by an affiliate of the issuer. Only ten per-
cent of rollup transactions, however, complied with Rule 13e-3's disclo-
sure requirements; the rule includes an exemption for transactions in
which investors receive an equity security with "substantially the same
rights" as the security they surrender, a requirement that, according to
the SEC staff, "historically has been deemed to be met if unaffiliated se-
curity holders receive common stock or limited partnership interests.
46
44. H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 2(b)(1)(E)(ii)(IV) (1991).
45. See Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, item 9(a) & (b) (1991). Item 8 in Schedule
13E requires the issuer itself to state whether it believes the transaction to be fair and the basis for its
belief. Id. item 8.
46. See SEC Rollup Report, supra note 3, at 113.
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Exemptions from l3e-3 aside, rollup sponsors generated many documents
reviewed by the SEC.
Investors, in turn, testified before congressional committees that they
found the several-hundred-page documents sent to them to be incompre-
hensible. Chairman Markey of the House subcommittee displayed a dia-
gram ranking the readability of various types of material. Rollup
disclosure documents ranked well below the minimum readability score
required by a majority of states for life and health insurance policies, and
ranked even below the Internal Revenue Code.4 7 To be sure, one might
have responded that difficulty in reading something illustrates the need
for competent professional advice. This avenue of response was fore-
closed when Richard Breeden, the SEC's Chairman, testified before the
Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee: "I have
taken a look at some of the documents filed with us in these roll-up trans-
actions and I would like to meet the person who can understand all of the
disclosures in some of those documents. '48
The SEC's new rule applies to all rollups subject to registration under
the Securities Act. In general, all rollups to which it applies are subject
to disclosure requirements comparable to those of SEC Rule 13e-3. Ad-
ditionally, the new rule requires the provision of individual-partnership
prospectus supplements to investors in each separate partnership in-
cluded in the rollup transaction, summarizing the transaction's effect on
that partnership. Separately, the SEC issued a release of interpretive
guidance under its earlier rules detailing how issuers should make disclo-
sure more comprehensible for investors (and, one hopes, for the SEC's
Chairman as well).49 Comparable to Rule 13e-3, the rollup rule requires
the general partner to state whether it believes the rollup is fair to inves-
tors in each partnership 0 and to state whether these views are based on
an opinion or report obtained from a third party. The disclosure docu-
ment must then identify any such opinion or report that is materially
related to the transaction and provide specific information about it.5 '
The rollup rule requires a comparison of the consideration to be gener-
47. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 6.
48. Limited Partnership Reorganizations, or "Rollups'" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Se-
curities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 74
(1991) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden).
49. Limited Partnership Reorganizations and Public Offerings of Limited Partnership Interests,
Securities Act Release No. 6900, 17 C.F.R. § 231 (1991).
50. See SEC Rollup Rule Proposal, supra note 7, at 81,826.
51. Id. at 81,827.
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ated for investors by the rollup with the consideration investors would
receive upon liquidation.12 It also requires the rollup sponsor to describe
the benefits it will receive from the transaction and any conflicts of inter-
est the transaction may produce.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REACTIONS
To what degree will these legislative and administrative reactions miti-
gate or eliminate the troubling aspects of rollups? An initial hunch is
that their efficacy is likely to vary considerably. As to the effect of addi-
tional disclosure requirements, standing alone, Chairman Breeden him-
self expressed reservations:
The Commission appreciates the concerns that members of Congress have
about whether limited partners have been treated fairly in roll-up transac-
tions. Some transactions may have been unfairly structured and unfairly
promoted. Ultimately, the answer to such fairness concerns, however, is
better articulation and enforcement of the state law fiduciary duties of gen-
eral partners towards limited partners. 53
Jeffry Davis and Kenneth Lehn's study of the impact and efficacy of SEC
Rule 13e-3 is an additional basis for cautious pessimism. Their study
found that higher premiums are paid to shareholders in exempt transac-
tions than in transactions subject to the rule.54
Other aspects of the reform packages seem more promising.
Mandatory dissenters' rights-whether state or federally created-re-
spond directly to investors' wish to exit from a bad deal that otherwise
could be imposed on them by majority vote. Moreover, as is frequently
pointed out in the corporate-law literature,55 investors' exercise of ap-
praisal rights depletes the surviving entity's cash, which is likely to be an
unappetizing prospect to a general partner concerned about enhancing or
maintaining its fee income. Mandatory dissenters' rights may thus pro-
vide an incentive to a transaction's proponent to structure it attractively,
so that fewer holders will dissent. To be sure, the congressional propos-
als, as described above, permit alternatives to cash appraisal rights when
such rights would not be feasible or would not be in limited partners'
52. Id. at 81,826.
53. Hearings, supra note 2, at 198 (statement of Richard C. Breeden).
54. Jeifry Davis & Kenneth Lehn, Information Asymmetries, Rule 13e-3 and Premiums in Going
Private Transactions, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 587 (1992).
55. See, e-g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
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interests. Much, then, could turn on the relative willingness or reluc-
tance of stock exchanges and securities associations to permit and super-
vise the use of these alternatives. Indeed, the effectiveness of the first
alternative-appointment of an independent negotiating committee for
the limited partners-would seem to depend on the spirit with which
committees discharge their undertaking. It is also worth noting that
state-law-mandated appraisal rights often contain exceptions and qualifi-
cations; for example, the California statute creating an appraisal right for
limited partners is inapplicable to holders of interests in publicly traded
limited partnerships unless five percent or more of any class of interest
demand that their interests be purchased for cash.56 Under some circum-
stances, moreover, the California statute makes appraisal the limited
partner's exclusive remedy." The congressional proposals, in contrast,
do not explicitly authorize these sorts of exceptions and qualifications to
a limited partner's right to "an appraisal and compensation. .. ."
The reform packages do not, however, speak directly to the ultimate
safeguard Chairman Breeden identified, that is, the fiduciary inhibitions
state law imposes on the general partner in its relationship with limited
partners. Fiduciary norms, defined as they are by courts in the context of
specific transactions, cannot enforce, articulate, or invigorate themselves.
Rollups appear to have generated surprisingly little litigation.58 One ex-
planation for the paucity of litigation is the relatively small amount the
typical limited partner invests.5 9 Another is that, to date, the SEC has
56. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15679.2(b)(1) (West 1991).
57. See id. § 15679.14. If a state statute makes appraisal the exclusive remedy for dissenting
security holders, but also denies appraisal rights for particular types of transactions, then dissenting
security holders are left with no remedy. A notorious example is the Virginia statute, which, while
making appraisal the exclusive remedy for stockholders opposing a merger, specifically excludes
bank mergers from appraisal. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-43 (Michie 1988). See generally Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991) (minority stockholder unable to show that
misleading proxy statement caused damage).
58. See SEC Rollup Report, supra note 3, at 121 (reporting high settlement rate among suits
challenging rollups). The sole reported opinion to date involving a rollup appears to be American
Insured Mortgage Investors v. CRI, Inc., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
95,730 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1990), which examines alleged violations of Exchange Act §§ 14(a), (d) &
(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (d) & (e) (1988), in connection with an exchange offer for limited partner-
ship units.
59. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of John F. Blake) (average limited partnership
investment was $10,000). One source suggests that limited partners may be inhibited in suing the
general partner because they fear its retaliation. See Hillier, supra note 28, at 160.
[Vol. 70:617
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/19
ROLLUPS OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
brought no enforcement action related to a rollup.6
Cases best known for their articulation of fiduciary norms are often
remembered more for the court's rhetorical flourishes than for its
application of the norms to resolve a concrete dispute. Meinhard v.
Salmon, for example, is best known for Judge Cardozo's insistence that
fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries "a punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive." We remember the rhetoric but not the opinion's more specific use
of fiduciary standards to analyze and resolve a dispute among joint ven-
turers in the ownership of an interest in commercial real estate.61 The
dearth of opinions dealing specifically and concretely with rollups coun-
sels caution in any attempt to extrapolate from opinions applying fiduci-
ary standards to other types of transactions. Some tentative observations
nonetheless are possible, drawing most directly from cases involving the
sale of partnership assets and less directly from cases evaluating self-deal-
ing transactions between corporations and their directors or majority
shareholders.
Partners who purchase partnership assets self deal in partnership prop-
erty. Fellow partners may consent to the purchase, either contemporane-
ously or, in advance, through express provisions in the partnership
agreement. Suppose the limited partners agree in the partnership agree-
ment that the general partner may, without their specific consent, acquire
"less than substantially all of the real property" owned by the partner-
ship, "upon terms which the General Partner shall determine in its sole
discretion." 62 In Jerman v. O'Leary, the agreement used this language,
and the court still held that the general partners' fiduciary obligation to
the limited partners obliged them to pay "fair market value" for the
property. Moreover, the court obliged the general partners "not to con-
ceal from their partners any facts in their possession which would bear
upon the question of fair market value" and to "reveal any other infor-
mation regarding the purchase of this property which bore upon its value
or the method they were utilizing to pay for it."63 Jerman specifically
criticized the general partners' failure to disclose a zoning change to the
property's appraiser and the general partners' apparent failure to seek a
new appraisal in light of this change. Although the general partners in-
60. See SEC Rollup Report, supra note 3, at 121 (SEC currently investigating "several" rollup
transactions).
61. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
62. See Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 1210.
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formed the limited partners of the zoning change, the court concluded
that a trier of fact could find that the general partners failed to act in
good faith and that, in breach of their fiduciary duty, they paid a price
for the property well below its market value.
In short, prior doctrine supports the proposition that limited partners'
generalized consent to the general partners' purchase of partnership
property does not exempt specific purchase transactions from judicial
scrutiny. The general partner continues to be subject to duties to be can-
did and to pay fair value for the property. An open question is the effect
on these duties of exculpation language authorized by statute. In 1990,
Delaware amended its version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act to provide that a partner's duties, including fiduciary duties,
"may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a partnership agree-
ment," and that a partner shall not be liable to the partnership or to
other partners "for the partner's good faith reliance on the provisions of
such partnership agreement. . . ."I' This language seems to permit the
partnership agreement to specify exclusively the general partner's duties.
It also permits exculpatory provisions in limited partnership agreements
that cut a much wider swath than certificate provisions that exculpate
corporate directors.65 One wonders whether a court would find that a
general partner relied "in good faith" on a provision like the consent-to-
purchase provision in Jerman if the purchase price were significantly less
than fair market value.66 If a general partner proposes to pay nothing or
next to nothing to purchase partnership assets, is the consent-to-purchase
provision operating in an unconscionable fashion?
If the partnership's assets are sold to a third-party purchaser, the gen-
eral partner has an obligation to account for value it diverts from the sale
transaction without the consent of the limited partners.67 The obligation
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (Supp. 1990).
65. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
66. Another issue is the impact of this statutory provision on the assumption that the general
partner's fiduciary obligations exist concurrently with rights and obligations defined by the partner-
ship agreement. See Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (provision in agreement
granting general partner "sole discretion" to make distributions of cash to limited partners does not
relieve general partner of fiduciary duty; general partner has burden of establishing that it acted
fairly), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 557 (I1. 1990). One court recently put the matter more strongly:
"The fiduciary duty of partners is an integral part of the partnership agreement whether or not
expressly set forth therein. It cannot be negated by the words of the partnership agreement." Wart-
ski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts law).
67. See In re U.S.A. Cafes, L.P. Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 96, 056 (Del. Ch. Jun. 7,
1991).
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to account-and, to an undetermined extent, other aspects of the general
partner's fiduciary obligation-extends to the controlling shareholders
and directors of a corporate general partner.6" If the benefit the general
partner receives is not disclosed to the limited partners, they would not
be able to consent to the general partner's receipt of it. Indeed, if the
limited partners' consent is to be adequately informed, the value of the
benefit-if susceptible to quantification-should be disclosed as well. In
evaluating whether a partner consented to his fellow partner's personal
pursuit of an investment opportunity in contravention of their partner-
ship agreement, a court recently emphasized the need for "complete and
unambiguous disclosure to the partnership."69 Similarly, according to
the same court, when one partner has superior knowledge or experience
that other partners rely upon, their dealings should be evaluated under a
high standard, indeed one requiring a "punctilio of honor."70
It is possible to structure an analysis of these issues as they pertain to
rollups by using the general framework adopted by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc. for going-private transac-
tions.' I Weinberger requires that such transactions meet a test of "entire
fairness." 72 More specifically, it subjects such transactions to two sepa-
rate tests of fairness: fair dealing and fair price.7" "Fair dealing" under
Weinberger encompasses questions of the transaction's timing, its initia-
tion and structuring, and the process through which its proponents ob-
tained the approval of the corporation's directors and shareholders.74
Applied to rollup transactions, the partnership cases discussed above fur-
ther flesh out the "fair dealing" test. Fair dealing, among other things,
requires that the limited partners be able to evaluate the effect of the
transaction on their investment interests, in close conjunction with the
benefit the transaction will yield to the general partner. The limited part-
ners' reliance on the general partner to operate the entity, and the general
partner's superior knowledge, require, at a minimum, a candid sharing of
68. Id. In US.A. Cafes, Chancellor Allen expressly declined to define the scope of directors'
and controlling shareholders' fiduciary duties to limited partners, mentioning specifically that his
opinion does not reach questions of liability for usurpation of opportunities and waste of assets. Id.
at 90,326 n.3.
69. See Wartski, 926 F.2d at 14.
70. Id. at 13.
71. Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
72. Id. at 710.
73. Id. at 711.
74. Id.
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the general partner's evaluation of the rollup transaction with the limited
partners.75 Perhaps these factors require more: if the general partner is
under a strong ongoing duty to consider its fellow partners' welfare and
to refrain from acting for purely private gain, 76 may it sponsor or en-
dorse a rollup that is not of real benefit to the limited partners? May it
sponsor or endorse a rollup that produces fewer benefits, however mea-
sured, for the limited partners than for itself?.
Although separable, questions of fair dealing intersect with questions
of fair price. As suggested above, and because the general partner is
under a duty to account to the partnership for the value of benefits it
receives, in the rollup context a "fair price" standard requires one to
examine the value of benefits going to the general partner in assessing the
fairness of the consideration received by limited partners. Additionally,
"fair price" analysis appropriately focuses on the position of limited part-
ners in an individual partnership that owns particular assets. Limited
partners are under no duty to rescue either their general partner or inves-
tors in affiliated limited partnerships, whether through a rollup transac-
tion or some other rescue vehicle.
Finally, the history of rollup transactions, coupled with the compelled
participation of nonassenting investors, suggests the relevance of fairness
standards developed in the context of bankruptcy reorganizations. De-
fenders of rollups characterized them as "reorganizations" of entities
that owned properties in temporarily distressed markets.77 Two bank-
ruptcy-specific notions of fairness are worth examining. First, a majority
of a class of creditors may not bind the nonassenting minority to the
terms of a reorganization, unless the plan of reorganization gives the
whole class of creditors value at least equal to liquidation value.7 8 Sec-
ond, the court may not impose a plan on a nonassenting class of credi-
tors, whose interests are impaired by the plan, unless that class receives
an absolute priority over claims of junior classes. 79 In a rollup, is it fair
75. Once again, the best rhetorical flourish is Judge Cardozo's. In Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica
Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918), a self-dealing director was said to be under a duty to
his fellow directors "to warn and to denounce" as to "improvidence or oppression, either apparent
on the surface, or lurking beneath the surface but visible to his practiced eye." Id. at 380.
76. Wartski, 926 F.2d at 20.
77. See, eg., Hearing, supra note 36, at 42, 88-89 (testimony of Christopher L. Davis and
William B. Dockser).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). That is, claims of the dissenting class must be paid in full
before any junior class may share in the plan.
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to require limited partners to accept less value than they would realize
upon liquidation of the limited partnership's assets? And is the rollup
fair if it advances the previously subordinated claims of the general part-
ner, placing them on a par with the residual ownership claims of the
dissenting limited partners?
In general, analysis under the "fair price" standard should reach more
broadly in the rollup context than it typically does in the going-private or
LBO setting. Rollups do not give limited partners cash, the easiest-to-
value consideration. Rather, they give an equity security in a new con-
solidated entity. The typical rollup continues the relationship between
limited partners and their general partner, rather than terminating it.
The general partner, by successfully sponsoring a rollup and redefining
its relationship with the limited partners, typically obtains a variety of
benefits and advantages that have no counterparts in an LBO or a going-
private transaction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the questions this Article raises await further developments.
The efficacy of the legislative and regulatory reforms directed to rollups
cannot be assessed in advance of their implementation. Likewise, the
significance of fiduciary norms in rollup scenarios cannot be determined
abstractly, without concrete application of these norms to individual im-
pugned transactions. It is evident, however, that the fundamental issues
rollups raise are neither unique nor unprecedented.
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